Eight Steps to Popularizing Presuppositional Apologetics

A presuppositional apologetic is a method of defending the Christian faith. Presuppositional apologetics are based on a recognition of the need to be committed to God and Scripture even when chatting with unbelievers who raise supposed intellectual objections to the faith. The result is that God and His Word are presupposed while arguments and evidence are presented. Other methods of apologetics start with presenting arguments and evidence before concluding that God exists or that Christianity is true. Presuppositional apologetics start with the existence of God and truth of Christianity before presenting arguments and evidence. Do not misunderstand; presuppostional apologetics do not do away with arguments and evidence, they just do not use them in the same way as other methods.

Presuppositional apologetics are quickly gaining popularity. This may be linked to some denominations returning to a belief in the inerrancy (and hence the importance) of Scripture. It may be linked as well to the so-called “New Calvinism” that is sweeping through the generation of young people born in the 70’s and 80’s. Presuppositionalism places great emphasis upon the Word of God and certain Calvinistic tenets like Total Depravity and the sovereignty of God so that it is interlinked with them. If the Word of God is taken as a sure thing and if Calvinism is “the gateway to Reformed theology” then we should not be surprised that this apologetic method will follow on the tail end of the two movements mentioned. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of work to be done if presuppositional apologetics are to grow as we might desire.

Currently, presuppositional apologetics are almost completely inaccessible. There are also few books to be had on the subject and these are rarely ever available in bookstores. Due to the emphasis on epistemology presuppositional apologetics are seen as rather difficult to all but those who have taken several courses in philosophy. There are massive terms and difficult arguments involved. Ivory tower intellectualism is typically not appealing to laypeople who find themselves supporting their families in busy and stressful work environments every day. We should not be concerned with stopping this method from doing its job so well in higher academic thought; there is certainly a place for this. However, we should be concerned about how seemingly impractical this method is currently. In response to this observation, I present eight suggestions for your consideration.

1.Presup must be presented in a more evidentialist format.

Ever seen those “[Insert topic here.] For Dummies” books? Surely there are people buying them or they would not continue to fill almost any bookstore one enters. People like “how-to” books. Most evidentialist literature is written somewhat like how-to books. There is clarity, organization, and step-by-step instruction. People need arguments spelled out rather than presented subtly amidst discussions of the history of philosophy. One book I highly recommend that is along the lines of what I have in mind here is Pushing the Antithesis by Greg Bahnsen (Gary DeMar). We need more books of this nature.

2.Presup must use a greater variety of simpler arguments not directly pertaining to epistemology.

The unbeliever cannot find intelligibility in anything if he or she is consistent. Human dignity and free will are just two areas that I have seen explored with great results in terms of presenting presup arguments that are not completely epistemological. We should seek to tap into many more arguments of this nature. There is more room for putting arguments of this kind that do not directly pertain to logic or induction into simpler terms. We do not need to dumb down our method, but we do not need to remove it so far from human experience that no one cares either.

3.Presup must have its terms unpacked for clarity and comprehension by the layperson.

Terms are nice for those in the know to quickly summarize a deeper point but they can easily turn others away. I do not doubt that many beginning presuppers get into the middle of debates and find some mantra they have been repeating getting challenged by their opponent with no response being able to be made by them. The great task of breaking our terms down into common language and explaining what they mean for the apologetic encounter is almost completely before us and not behind.

4.Presup must stop being used almost exclusively against materialistic atheism.

It is cool to point out that logic does not smell like dung or taste like chicken, but for those who want to subscribe to some weird two-worlds doctrine there is not much of an argument there. You can also find this argument in many non-presup books. Let us be honest, atheists are fun to debate and usually make themselves ready for any opportunity to debate with us, but atheism is hardly the position of most unbelievers we encounter each and every day. We need more literature, more debates, and more arguments pertaining to other versions of unbelieving thought. The method is made to appear weak and incapable of dealing with other views when it is focused so much upon atheism and is so rarely placed against other positions.

5.Presup must be taught exclusively to greater extent by “new blood” not necessarily connected to narrower Reformed movements.

Many of the finer groups who adhere to the presup method have seen it lead them into many other areas of related thought that they often find entailed by presup. I do not have a problem with this, but it does draw the discussion quickly away from presup as an apologetic. Further, there are not many very well known apologists who are also strong proponents of presup. There are also not many obscure individuals or groups promoting the method. We need people willing to learn and to teach presup.

6.Presup must be taught in churches.

If the Word of God is being taught, so is presup. We should bring this out of the texts we preach and teach when they pertain to such subjects as anthropology, epistemology, creation, Lordship, Christology, etc. Our people are hungry for a certainty in the things of God, and Sunday School or small groups is another great avenue for teaching how to defend the faith biblically rather than according to worldly standards. We need to take the opportunities God gives us.

7.Presup must be used to critique evidentialist methods.

If people do not think that their method is broken, then they will not see any reason to fix it, much less replace it. This one is not going to win a lot of friends, but we must cast secular “science”, opinions of liberal theologians, mysticism, spiritualism, Aristotelian and Roman Catholic philosophy out of our churches yesterday. Aside from being offensive to God, traditional arguments do not work anyway! Our people need something more sure than this, and they have it, they just need to be shown that this is the case.

8.Presup must be taught from the Bible.

If presup is truly the biblical method of defending the faith, then there is absolutely no excuse for the absence of Scripture from so many presentations of it. There are loads of passages in Scripture which directly bear upon our apologetic that require exegesis and application in a more explicitly apologetic way. We read, memorize, study, and overlook relevant passages all the time! There is a massive amount of extremely careful work to be done in this regard.

Are sunglasses evidence of God?

“The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals knowledge. There is no speech, nor are there words, whose voice is not heard. Their voice goes out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.”
Psalms 19:1-4 (ESV)

The other day I jumped into a conversation about the presuppositional approach to hermeneutics. One of the individuals involved in the conversation was talking a bit about the use of evidence and saying that evidences are not always bad.

Well, I must agree. Evidences are never “bad”! It is when someone fails to utilize evidences properly that they can become problematic. My contention in the discussion was that the presuppositionalist is more evidentialist than the evidentialist. The evidence of God is not hidden in syllogistic arguments. Everything is evidence of the existence of God. I cited the relevant portion of Psalm 19 above and received one nod. I could not tell whether the other gentleman was being sarcastic or not, but he grinned and exclaimed, “Your sunglasses are evidence!” and pointed to the other student before walking off.

Of course, I find nothing absurd about holding that sunglasses are evidence of the existence of God. Indeed, everything is created by Him and for Him and hence His glory is revealed in all. There is the intuitive need to locate the origin of the created matter itself which is used in making sunglasses. There is the human ingenuity which went into designing and forming a pair of sunglasses. There is the purpose for which sunglasses are made and their function which meshes with this purpose, in and of itself enough to boggle the mind in terms of the science involved. Surely these constitute evidential characteristics of a pair of sunglasses, howbeit only when viewed according to the proper presuppositions of the Christian worldview. We need cut a bit deeper to get at the root of the problem for those who still do not see the glasses as evidencing the God whom we serve.

There are the reliable senses by which our perceptions of sunglasses are formed, the universals by which we categorize our experience and the trustworthy memory with which we approach these and other cognitive processes. There are the extrapolations contingent upon the inductive processes that fill our every thought of sunglasses and there is the language we use to communicate to others regarding sunglasses, even if it is to scoff at the idea that they constitute evidence of the existence and nature of God.

Every fact of existence screams about God. Sunglasses are not excluded, and what we have reviewed barely scratches the surface. Sunglasses constitute massive problems for those who would rebel against God. The evidence does not get us to our conclusions. We all have our presuppositions by which we evaluate the evidence. We must thus argue transcendentally. We may start from any fact and ask, “What are the preconditions for intelligibility in this instance? How do we come to understand this fact at all?” This world is created, sustained, and controlled by God and hence we argue on His turf. There is none other to argue on.

Come now, sunglasses evidence our Creator? Yes, and such is an extremely malleable bullet to bite.

“There is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: ‘Mine!’” – Abraham Kuyper

The failure of unbelief with respect to induction illustrated by Mitch LeBlanc.

Mitch LeBlanc continues to espouse his inconsistencies regarding induction in his most recent post found here – http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/further-thoughts-and-clarifications-on-induction-and-the-christian-god/

Mitch Admits His Problem

He writes, “…I simply mean to suggest that one should be as skeptical about the problem of induction as the problem is skeptical of inductive reasoning itself.”
With this he begs the question. I pointed out that he did so in his previous post and he continues to do so now. The existence of debate regarding a given topic does not entail skepticism. If he is unsure of whether or not there is a Problem of Induction then we can go to the mat on the issue, but to mention that the topic is debated as though this puts some argument in his corner or makes the presentation of an alleged problem go away is simply a mistake. In his most recent post Mitch makes it clear that he does agree with me that there is a Problem of Induction anyway, so why is he wasting time throwing around the names of philosophers who think there may not be a problem and expressing a feigned skeptical attitude toward there being a problem?

If Mitch wants to entertain the idea that invalid reasoning is not unreasonable and hence is rational then he may go ahead and do so, but aside from a quick allusion to this one time in his original post he has not developed a defense of such an idea.
Mitch believes that there is a Problem of Induction and writes, “I think there is an inability to justify our extrapolations of past events into the future”. Now that he has finally admitted this, the readers will expect him to at least provide an answer to the problem after all of the trouble he has put us through in inconsistently presenting us with a multitude of positions he does not hold in the face of the presuppositionalist’s challenge to do so. What is his answer?

His Proposed Solution; Pragmatism

“Admittedly, I am still making my way through Reichenbach’s writings on probability theorem but I agree with him that if there are any true inductions our consistent use of induction will eventually discover them. This justification is pragmatic in nature but certainly a reason for it’s continued use.”

Mitch appears quite confident that finishing a book will provide him with his answer as to a sort of justification for induction. (So much for unbiased reading!) Just from the little bit he pulls from Reichenbach we find a number of problems. The method is itself based upon induction and hence falls prey to Hume’s original objection. We will come to the same conclusions, using Reichenbach’s method, that we will come to if we do not. Even this begs the question though, as it is likewise based on induction. We cannot state that the future will resemble the past in terms of the allegedly pragmatic nature of induction without using induction. We might cut out the heart of a virgin every year to keep the world from ending and proclaim that the practice obviously works, but few (I hope none reading this) will accept the claim.

Scientific Knowledge Impossible

We must be very clear about what Mitch is stating with regard to science. If he is consistent, we cannot know anything through science, not even with probability. Thankfully he seems to understand this as opposed to most people who tout the “falsifiability” line while overlooking its origins. Mitch writes that “Scientific theories cannot be supported, but they can be corroborated by virtue of their falsifiability.” Again, notice that we cannot have knowledge through science. He goes on to explain what he means by theories being corroborated. He writes, “That is to say, the better of two theories will be the one which has been subjected to more falsification attempts and has not yet been falsified”. I find the assertion that a theory somehow becomes more certain through more testing dubious and the assertion that a theory which has undergone more tests is the better theory dubious as well.

Square One

Interestingly, Mitch does not apply Popper’s method outside the realm of science. He is thus left clinging to a pragmatic attempt at justifying induction and Popper’s problem filled method in the realm of science. He is right that I do not find his proposed solutions very convincing. By his own admission, he cannot know anything through science and is unreasonable in his use of induction. After all the fuss that has been made it turns out that Mitch falls right back into the grip of the Problem of Induction. Why does Mitch expect his next glass of water to remain water anymore than he expects it to turn into merlot?

Failed Attack On Christianity

As for the remainder of Mitch’s response, it relies heavily upon continued misunderstandings or misrepresentations of presuppositionalism. The argument is presuppositional in nature and epistemology revelational. The God of the Bible has communicated to us. The Word of God is the final authority, it cannot be held up to a higher authority. The Word of God is the ultimate presupposition, as opposed to proximate. God does not change, does not lie, governs the world and hence justifies our use of induction through causing creation to exhibit non-absolute regularities and fashioning our minds in such a way that they function in accordance with the operations of nature with the result that we come to know His world though not necessarily with certainty. If Mitch wants to argue with someone who claims to have some different presupposition then he should go elsewhere. It is not only impossible for me to give up my presupposition as has been clearly shown in the confusion Mitch offers in response to an old problem of philosophy, it would also be sinful for me to do so.

Conclusion

Mitch is showing himself to be incapable of rejecting my worldview without losing his claims to knowledge and rationality. He is also exhibiting inconsistencies which are indicative of failed argument. Having made this clear I would call upon Mitch to turn from his would-be lordship over himself and submit instead to the Lordship of Christ Jesus of Scripture who upholds the universe by His power, was crucified for sins, buried, and raised again on the third day in accordance with Scripture. There is forgiveness for sins of foolishness in Christ the Lord.

With A Wave of His Wand: How Mitch LeBlanc Answers the Problem of Induction

Introduction

Mitch LeBlanc wrote an indirect response to me regarding the Problem of Induction wherein he relied heavily upon Michael Martin to deal with the presuppositionalist utilization of the famous problem. He apparently recognizes, to some extent, the alleged challenge set forth. My response to his post may be found here – http://choosinghats.blogspot.com/2009/09/mitch-leblancs-proposed-solution-to.html . He has now written another post here – http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/inductive-reasoning-and-the-christian-god/ wherein he states that I have missed the point of his previous article. He claims that his post is not intended to be a solution to the Problem of Induction and that it is debatable as to whether or not there is such a problem. In this post I will address one error on my part from my previous post before showing that Mitch’s most recent response consists of little more than hand waiving.

My Bad

In rereading Mitch’s post, it does appear that I misunderstood him concerning the quote regarding induction in science and the possibility of the sun not rising. The error is on my part and I am sorry for the confusion. It does not appear to have played a massive role in my post so I will move on.

Ignoring The Problem

Mitch writes, “Nowhere in my article did I attempt to provide a solution for the problem, but rather echo the fact that even the idea that there IS such a problem is still debated.”

“Nowhere in my article did I attempt to provide a solution for the problem…”

There appears to be no pragmatic difference between arguments from philosophers who try to dismiss the Problem of Induction and those that are set forth in an attempt to resolve the problem in a stricter sense. One way to resolve a problem is to show that it is not a problem. Both groups of arguments are set forth to show that ultimately, there is no problem. The works of the philosophers mentioned by Mitch are grouped with literature addressing the Problem of Induction. If there were not an alleged problem there would not be a reason for these philosophers to address the topic at all. It may be that there is no problem, but Mitch has not shown this. Indeed, what Mitch actually does is asserts that there is debate about whether or not there is a Problem of Induction and then assumes without any argument at all that there is nota Problem of Induction.

“…but rather echo the fact that even the idea that there IS such a problem is still debated.”

Also, “…the citing of various names is to show that the specific philosophical area we’re speaking of is still hotly debated!”

If Mitch wants to play the role of philosopher he will need to move quickly past this strange reasoning where mentioning that something is debated somehow makes it go away in favor of his own position. When Mitch writes, “As it stands then, presuppositionalists are simply bending the evidence when they present this idea that there certainly is a problem of induction and even moreso when they assert that they have the solution”, he blatantly begs the question. Mitch has not provided us with an argument that there is no problem. It must be pointed out that the presuppositionalist is not similarly begging the question or “bending the evidence”. Hume wrote on the problem, Russell wrote on the problem, Bahnsen wrote on the problem, I have written on the problem, and now Mitch himself has written on the problem. If it is not a problem at all, then please, show us why it is not. If it is a problem, provide us with a solution. Whether we leave this distinction or do away with it is rather unimportant for our purposes. Mitch has not provided a response to what has been raised regarding induction. Mitch misses my point. Naming philosophers is not argumentation. Stating that something is debatable is also not argumentation. I will leave it to the imaginations of the readers to spell out the results of an application of the slippery slope to this type of response used in the context of supposed philosophical discourse!

Inconsistency

We may have reason to disregard the entirety of the discussion thus far, for Mitch writes, “In fact, with regard to Science I agree with Popper’s falsifiability criterion and his conclusion that science relies primarily on deductive reasoning”. One of the biggest reasons Popper developed his philosophy was in response to the Problem of Induction. Mitch’s view of science may be incompatible with his argument that there is no such problem, as the view he holds is itself a result of taking the Problem of Induction seriously. Are we to agree with Popper that there are some real concerns about induction, or are we to agree with the other philosophers Mitch lists?
Where is the compatibility between the statement about induction that Mitch has written, “the uniformity of nature…is used in inductive reasoning” and the views of the pragmatists and Popper? Mitch must be rather confused. He appears to be simply throwing out names and views and hoping one of them sticks. He makes statements like that above concerning induction and how it works which aligns him with the answer to the problem Hume refuted then says that he is not trying to answer the problem because there is not one by appealing to pragmatists without actually presenting any of their arguments then jumps to accepting the view of Popper that was briefly touched on above. What exactly are we supposed to come to believe through all of these posts?

Wrong With Martin…Again

Mitch writes that, “…the relevance of quoting Martin on his analysis of Hume was specifically because Hume is the primary source of Bahnsen’s critique on induction. It stands to reason then that if Bahnsen is quoting Hume and misunderstanding what Hume meant, then either Bahnsen must abandon his advocacy of Hume’s ‘problem of induction’, appeal to another philosopher or reformulate the problem himself.”

I encourage the reader to check my original response to Martin’s quote. The quote is full of problems that Mitch just overlooks, the most significant being that, “…this observation Martin makes is not available for taking by Mitch, as he has already stated that we ‘owe this skepticism to the likes of Bertrand Russell and David Hume as both of these philosophers raised important skeptical questions about the usage of inductive reasoning’”. My original treatment of the quote shows several problems with what Martin would have us believe regarding Hume. We can go through the exegesis if it is necessary. Martin is wrong. I would presume that Bahnsen understood the relationship of Hume to the Problem of Induction in much the same way that I do. That is, Hume presented the problem better and popularized it. As for the latter part of Mitch’s assertion, if Bahnsen is misunderstanding yet quoting Hume and still presenting a problem then he has reformulated the problem. Mitch has no need to run through such hypotheticals as he has not shown that Bahnsen is misunderstanding Hume. Most importantly, Mitch is not responding to Bahnsen, he is responding to me.

More Unfamiliarity

Mitch writes that he is “disappointed” with my response to his objections to the Christian response to induction, finds it “largely superficial” and calls it “patent silliness”. Frankly, I find his “approach” to the Problem of Induction rather silly, but this does not constitute argumentation anymore than writing lists of the names of philosophers does. Mitch, like many others I speak to regarding this topic, is confused because he likely does not have a good understanding of the problem. The principle of uniformity cannot be disproven through an appeal to experience. Just because our expectations may turn out to be wrong in some given case or cases does not mean that our expectations will not obtain in others. The problem for Mitch is that he has not justified his use of the principle of uniformity which he states is necessary to inductive reasoning with the result that he has no reason at all to give us for having the expectations he does. This line of thought is explicitly stated by Russell. To put it in very simple terms, Mitch has not shown us how we can know that nature will continue to exhibit any regularities at all. I can. Miracles are by definition rare occurrences.

Still Waiting On A Response To The Problem Of Induction

“As for my ‘grasping for problems that are not there’, I’d simply contend that presuppositionalism has a monopoly on this point and I dare not attempt to take share away from the stockholders.”

Mitch has taken the time to write two blog posts “in response” to me about a supposedly non-existent problem but cannot seem to give a very straight answer on where he stands regarding the alleged problem or how it is not actually a problem for him, though he has alluded to several attempts at resolutions which differ significantly from the response of a man whose rhetorical style he here mimics.
The remainder of Mitch’s response stems from his misunderstanding regarding the basics of presuppositional apologetics. I offer this now only as an assertion and hope to come back to it in future posts. The short version is that Mitch does not seem to get that presuppositionalists believe the Bible.

Mitch LeBlanc’s Proposed Solution to the Problem of Induction

Introduction

Mitch LeBlanc has written a post concerning induction ( found here – http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/inductive-reasoning-and-the-christian-god/ ) in which he writes that “the uniformity of nature (or rather the principle of the uniformity of nature) states that ‘the future will resemble the past’ and is used in inductive reasoning”. He then attempts to describe the difference between deduction and induction and writes, “…in a deductive argument it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false (provided the argument is valid/sound)”. All Mitch need write in his parenthesis is “provided the argument is valid”. If an argument is sound then the argument is valid and the premises true. Whether or not the conclusion must necessarily be true given a valid deductive argument with true premises has been debated, but I do not wish to enter into that here. I will pass over his example of an inductive argument. Pointing out that the first premise (“All men are mortal.”) of his example of a deductive argument is itself a conclusion drawn from induction will do. This post will show that while Mitch apparently thinks that he has a solution to the Problem of Induction, he does not, and furthermore he is unable to find a fatal problem with the Christian worldview as it pertains to this well known philosophical problem.

Mitch On Induction

Mitch apparently grants that scientific reasoning is “largely inductive in nature” and even grants the possibility that the sun might not rise tomorrow. He writes, “Science would invoke the principle of the uniformity of nature, presuming that in certain circumstances the future will resemble the past. For example, because the sun has risen everyday in the past, it is probable that it will rise tomorrow. Though [sic] it is, of course, possible that the sun may not.” He further writes, “Bolt, and all presuppositionalists seems [sic] to be very skeptical of inductive reasoning (or at least, Godless inductive reasoning) and they owe this skepticism to the likes of Bertrand Russell and David Hume as both of these philosophers raised important skeptical questions about the usage of inductive reasoning.” I do not know that this is the case with all presuppositionalists or that said skepticism is owing to Hume or Russell, but what he writes next is much more important. With “they” apparently referring to Hume and Russell, Mitch writes, “But since they have raised such issues, there has been ample response to the so called ‘problems [sic] of induction’ from the philosophical community”. Now I am aware that there is a great deal of literature written concerning the topic at hand, but this does not in and of itself mean that the problem has been resolved. Indeed, it is most often those problems which do not appear to have any resolution which elicit the grandest response from the pens of philosophers. I believe this to be the case with respect to the Problem of Induction.

Martin On Induction

Unfortunately Mitch turns at this point to mostly parroting Michael Martin, quoting him to the effect that Hume may not have actually held the view that most modern philosophers attribute to him concerning induction. Martin writes, “A detailed analysis of Hume’s works has shown that by ‘probabilistic argument’ Hume meant a certain type of deductive argument. Hume believed that all such arguments presuppose the uniformity of nature, but he did not attempt to show that probabilistic arguments in the modern sense are unjustified. Thus, appeals to Hume prove very little about whether inductive, that is, probabilistic arguments, are justified.” In my study of Hume I have found Martin to be quite incorrect in his evaluation of what Hume presents, but exegesis may be set aside for now. The reason the issue need not be pressed with respect to our purposes here is because whether or not someone interprets Hume correctly or not has little to do with the argument that has been raised regarding induction. Whether what someone labels the “Problem of Induction” actually comes from Hume or from Homer is unimportant with respect to providing a response to the problem (and in fact, the Problem of Induction was discussed long before Hume came on the scene, he merely presented it better and popularized it). In any event, this observation Martin makes is not available for taking by Mitch, as he has already stated that we “owe this skepticism to the likes of Bertrand Russell and David Hume as both of these philosophers raised important skeptical questions about the usage of inductive reasoning”. There are further problems with the quote from Martin. For example, Hume did not believe “that all such arguments presuppose the uniformity of nature”, but rather offered this as one possible solution to the problem he raised and then set out to refute it. Further, there is not, so far as I can tell, a “modern sense” to “probabilistic arguments”. Such a phrase is almost humorous given the amount of disagreement that exists about the subject of probability. So much for the quote from Martin.

Scattershot

Mitch goes on to give us more Martin by following his method of throwing out names of philosophers who have written on the subject of induction apparently hoping that one of the more well known responses sticks. Mitch cites Martin concerning Strawson, Edwards, and Gemes. Throwing out names of philosophers is not the same thing as doing philosophy. If it were I might as well write “Plantinga, Swinburne, Craig” thus finishing the discussion and freeing me to go watch Lost with my wife. Mitch has much bigger worries when it comes to using this piece from Martin though. The philosophers mentioned do not solve the problem, the answers provided by these philosophers and others like them in relevant literature are often incompatible with each other so that Mitch cannot appeal to all of them, and most importantly Mitch has excluded this line of defense from his position anyway as he writes, “the uniformity of nature…is used in inductive reasoning”. Mitch is hence refuted directly by Hume as it was shown in his work long ago that the principle of the uniformity of nature appealed to in Mitch’s use of induction already assumes induction. Since this attempted solution to the Problem of Induction is mostly incompatible with Reichenbach’s and Madden’s pragmatic “solutions” as it is with the solutions of the philosophers already mentioned, I will only briefly point out that neither of these men has provided a solution to the problem raised in terms of any sort of justification and further their pragmatic use of induction also assumes induction. There are only so many approaches to solving the Problem of Induction, but judging by what Mitch offers as his solution he is probably unaware of this.

Christianity

Mitch, apparently thinking that he has offered a cogent response to the problem before us, moves on to try and attack the Christian worldview on the same point. Mitch confusedly writes, “Christianity claims to have a guarantee to the uniformity of nature. But [sic] how can this be when Christian apologists themselves says [sic] that it is possible that God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil in the world. [sic]” Now, I do not just believe it possible that God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil in the world, but rather believe that God actually does have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil in the world. This is hardly relevant to the justification of induction, however. God can and does allow for such things as say, hurricanes. Mitch writes, “Insofar as God could have morally sufficient reasons for a natural disaster, he could have sufficient reasons for causing…a departure from the normal. Just as we can account for all the evil in the world by appealing to God’s sufficient reasons, so too could the same apply for any departure from a preconceived uniformity of nature!” Finally we see how Mitch tries to tie the Problem of Evil to the Problem of Induction. The argument is creative, but extremely easy to answer. Indeed, one wonders if there is a real argument here at all. Could God have a sufficient reason for causing a departure from the normal? Depending on what we mean by “normal”, the answer is, “Yes, and in fact He has caused departures from the normal”. It does not follow from this that we cannot know the normal, if that is what Mitch (really Martin) implies. Could we appeal to God’s sufficient reasons for any departure from the uniformity of nature? Of course; in fact, I do. It does not follow that we cannot expect uniformity in nature. Mitch is grasping for problems that are not there.

Martin Embarrassed

Scripture as a whole presents a world which exhibits regularity under the control of God, thus the argument from the verse cited by Martin and repeated by Mitch need not be refuted here, although it is not beyond refutation. For example it is asked why we should suppose that passages of the Bible are true, as though this is not one of the questions before us in the discussion. Martin explicitly denies that the changing of seasons on Earth involve other factors in the Universe outside of Earth. Martin suggests that God might change and break one of His promises, something which is impossible for the God of the Bible to do. I have pointed out many times now that attempts to ascribe a nature and actions to God that are different from those described in Scripture are nothing more than strawman arguments. Such attempts show how desperate those opposed to Christ are to get rid of an argument that they are unable to answer. Mitch writes, (although if I remember correctly this is a quote from Martin, it is not in quotation marks on Mitch’s post), “Perhaps Satan decided to work his evil by bringing inductive chaos into the world, and God does not interfere because he does not want to deprive Satan of his free will”. I am not sure how this is a problem for me since I do not believe that Satan has a free will. Finally Mitch writes (again copied from Martin), “…even if the Christian worldview must be assumed to make sense of X it does not follow that it is true”. The trouble here is that one cannot “assume the Christian worldview” without accepting that it is true, as the claim to truth is itself a necessary constituent of the Christian worldview. I find it really unfortunate that Mitch copies such embarrassing statements from Martin apparently without giving them much thought, but he does so throughout his post.

Conclusion

It has been shown that Mitch offers no solution to the Problem of Induction that has not already been refuted, as he offers one of the responses offered and refuted by Hume himself. Further, Mitch has shown no problems with the solution available to the Christian on this matter. Finally, Mitch’s work shows unfamiliarity with the subject it addresses and is dependent almost exclusively on the work of Michael Martin even to the point of repeating many of his embarrassing statements.

Logical Fallacies In Presuppositionalism

“I’ll be honest Chris…it amazes me that just like Greg Bahnsen you’ve done a degree in Philosophy yet can’t see through the multitude of logical fallacies present in presuppositionalism. Like all other presuppositionalists you also appear completely unable to demonstrate to any degree of satisfaction how Christ presents you with wisdom, knowledge or certainty despite these bold claims.”

Notice the assertion that there are a “multitude of logical fallacies present in presuppositionalism” as well as the claim to have come into contact with “all other presuppositionalists”. The author goes on to provide alleged examples of these fallacies, however it is hardly a multitude, and we might question how many of them are logical fallacies even given the assumption that they apply.

“The fact that the entire premise is based on argument from ignorance and could as easily be used to ‘prove’ that aliens cause crop circles via ‘the impossibility of the contrary’”

Notice that this is asserted as “fact”. It is unclear as to what “premise” refers to or what “argument” it is based on. If I had to guess I would think that “premise” refers to presuppositionalism and “argument” refers to TAG, but presuppositionalism is not “based on” TAG. An argument which points out inherent difficulties in a worldview does not fall prey to the fallacy of argument from ignorance. Knowing that a worldview is incoherent, contradictory, arbitrary, etc. has nothing to do with ignorance. There is no application of the fallacy given toward the argument in question, nor is there support given to the claim that the argument may be used to prove that aliens cause crop circles. It is possible to create a crop circle by attaching a rope to both ends of a board and then pushing cornstalks down with the tool at night without being seen. I am at a loss as to how this is applicable to TAG.

“The best you could hope to prove is that someone you are debating directly or people in general are ignorant of some particular fact(s). This doesn’t constitute a validation of some idea you may hold, the onus is on you to support your claims regardless of what anyone else might know or not”

The author apparently holds that a worldview can never be shown to be false. According to him, all that may be shown is that an adherent of a worldview is ignorant of a fact. This is said to be the best we could hope to prove. Yet the author holds that my worldview is false. If it is always the case that the position of an individual can never be shown to be false because there is actually some fact which resolves some alleged problem then it follows that no worldview is false. What I think the author is missing here is that showing that a worldview is false is not accomplished through showing that someone is ignorant of some fact but rather through showing that the worldview in question is itself flawed.

“The fact that assertion is considered to be as good as a well supported argument eg that the believer has some means of direct communication with God allowing him/her to know certain things about the world, which is just blatant nonsense since they can’t actually demonstrate this fact. If you do genuinely believe that you have this ability, I know that I (and I’m fairly sure anyone else reading this) would like to see you demonstrate it.”

The author would need to show me through argument that his assertion here is true, since as far as I know I do not consider assertion to be as good as a well supported argument. It appears that he is confusing assertions with argument. Assertions are not the same thing as arguments. Depending upon how one defines “assertion” they are necessary for argument. For example, I assert that God has directly communicated to me and that God allows me to know certain things about the world and even that He gives me certain knowledge about the world through His communicating to me but this is not argument. However, assertions may be used in an argument or arguments. Now the author asserts that, for example, my assertion that I have a means of direct communication with God allowing me to know certain things about the world is “blatant nonsense”. He goes on to argue for this assertion. He states that the reason he considers this “blatant nonsense” is because I “can’t actually demonstrate this fact”. Of course, according to him, the best he “could hope to prove is that…[I am]…ignorant of some particular fact” which would show that my assertion is not “blatant nonsense”. It does not follow that something is blatant nonsense if someone is unable to demonstrate that the something is itself the case.

“As regards the biblical authors’ claims to this ability, you’re no doubt aware…folk like John Frame concede that they don’t have a clue how to validate the claim that God communicated with the biblical writers beyond simply claiming ‘we know that we know without knowing how we know’”

I do not believe that God communicated with the vast majority of the writers of the Bible if we are speaking of dictation as a means of inspiration. If it is asked how I know that God communicated to people or that the Bible is God-breathed the answer will be that the Bible tells me so.

“The fact that loads of their arguments contradict each other, often within a few sentences of each other eg the idea that God provides the conditions for knowledge or uniformity of nature yet as van Til says can set one set of facts into new relation to ‘created law’ any time he so wishes – how could anyone claim to know anything, or claim that the world is likely to remain uniform on that view?”

The author asserts that there are loads of contradictory arguments and presents a supposed example of two “arguments” which supposedly contradict each other but do not. Again, “loads” of arguments “contradict” each other, but only one alleged example is provided. If God exists then He regulates nature though He can do otherwise. It does not follow that He actually does or ever will do otherwise and the testimony of Scripture shows the opposite to be the case.

“The fact that they openly admit to affirming contradictory ideas that they have no good explanation for eg the Trinity, the 100% man/100% God doctrine, the ones in point 3 above etc etc, yet at the same time claim that internal contradictions are what invalidate other worldviews!”

If I affirm contradictory ideas it is an error. I do not know what is meant by an “explanation” for a “contradiction”. The author offers the Trinity as an example of a contradiction but does not explain how it is such. I do not know that I affirm the “100% man 100% God doctrine”, though I do believe that Jesus is fully God and fully man. There are no contradictions given “in point 3 above” and I do not know what “etc etc” refers to. It may be important to note, if the author is trying to get at what I think he is; lack of comprehensive explanation is not the same thing as contradiction. The author here also acknowledges the use of internal contradictions to point out the falsehood of a worldview but appeared to be ignorant of that fact during his discussion of adherents to worldviews being ignorant of some facts.

“Certain claims are so vague or meaningless as to not be worth bothering with eg Bahnsen’s claim that while God accounts for logic, God’s logic may not be the same as ours – who does he think he’s fooling with this sort of vacuous rubbish?”

There is only one supposed example given of a claim that is “vague or meaningless”. If the claim that God accounts for logic but the logic of God may not be the same as ours is vague or meaningless then we are in no place to call it “vacuous rubbish”, though I can see the rhetorical value in doing so. When I come across something I find to be vague or meaningless I am encouraged to investigate the claim to understand what is meant. It may be that the claim turns out to be true or false or actually meaningless, but I cannot know this if I do not investigate the claim. When someone sees a vague or meaningless claim as being not “worth bothering with” then he or she has no place to call that same claim “vacuous rubbish”.

“Regarding the latter part of your response, first of all simply because you believe in such a being, it does not follow that such a being does actually exist.”

I do not make this argument.

“Even if we were to concede such a being did exist for argument’s sake this is still no better than me saying something like ‘Robert Oppenheimer had an immense knowledge of nuclear physics therefore this means I also have an immense knowledge of nuclear physics’ – just because someone or something has a certain level knowledge on a given matter, it doesn’t follow that everyone else also acquires this knowledge by proxy.”

I do not make this argument.

“Presumably you consider at least some of this knowledge to have been imparted by divine revelation, but then this just open a hold new world of problems most of which have already been pointed out to you: eg how would you distinguish revelation from delusion or revelation from evil spirits or a lying God (remember, simply assuming God doesn’t lie doesn’t answer the question – any liar can insist that they only tell the truth (verses like 2 Thessalonians 2:11 don’t exactly favour your point in this regard either))?”

Supposedly a “hold [sic] new world of problems” has been pointed out to me regarding knowledge imparted by divine revelation. Notice the constant use of words referring to supposed large numbers of problems without any substance to back up such uses. Revelation is in this context that which comes from God and delusion is the state of an individual so I am not sure what the question means. Revelation and evil spirits likewise belong to wholly different categories. Liars may insist that they are telling the truth, but God is not a liar. To attempt to force me to defend a view that I do not hold is rather pointless. It is one of the most fundamental claims of presuppositionalism that it operates with respect to the Christian God. This must be understood if one is to understand anything else regarding presuppositionalism or TAG.

“How would you validate the revelation claims of the biblical writers beyond simpy taking it on their say-so? (especially when you consider that a. substantial amounts of discoveries in the physical and life sciences, history, archaeology, medical research etc would indicate that the biblical authors were either wrong or ignorant on a number of matters) and that b. Christianity endorses a number of contradictions (see earlier examples))? none of this is what we’d expect from people who had access to an infallible source of knowledge.”

There is no higher authority by which to “validate” the Word of God than God. The Word of God is self-authenticating. This is again basic presuppositionalism. Notice again in this paragraph the use of words referring to supposed large numbers; “substantial amounts”, “number of matters”, and “number of contradictions”. Notice also that these supposed problems are all merely asserted without anything provided to back them up, and that the alleged contradictions mentioned from before have already been dealt with.

“As before, if you have some infallible means of acquiring knowledge that isn’t open to non-believers, we’d expect you are able to tell us things you couldn’t possibly otherwise know about us – anyone who makes such a claim should surely realise that they are going to get called on it sooner rather than later.”

I do not deny that non-believers have knowledge.

Response To Mitch LeBlanc’s Odd Ontological Argument

Mitch LeBlanc has written an alleged defense of his attempt to redefine God and hence defeat the presuppositionalist program. You may find his article here:
http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/

Mitch writes, “I would first like to explain that while the idea of a lying God is logically absurd on a Thomist conception of God, it is not logically absurd on a Presuppositionalist conception.” What follows this claim is rather odd. Mitch thinks that a Thomist appealing to Anselm’s “definition” of God can show that the idea of a lying God is logically absurd. The Thomist may do so as follows:

“1. God is the being that which none greater can be conceived
2. It is greater to be honest than to be a liar
3. Therefore, God is honest.”

However if Mitch grants this, then he should have no trouble granting this:

“1. God is the being described in Christian Scripture
2. The description excludes the possibility of lying
3. Therefore, God is honest.”

There is also no problem if Mitch thinks that the definition provided via Anselm is compatible with the God of Christian Scripture.

All of this is in accordance with what Mitch has himself presented. One may expect that I should present something a bit different.

As many different concepts of gods as there are why should Anselm’s be accepted? Rejecting the concept appears to entail no contradiction. It looks arbitrary unless we take into account where it is being used at which point it looks contrived. Even accepting the intentionality proposed in the first premise, there is no reason given to accept the second premise. Why should we accept that it is greater to be honest than to be a liar? Perhaps it is greater to be a liar than to be honest. Mitch will need to argue for this premise if it is to stick, but, and this is the most significant part of the response to what Mitch offers regarding Thomism; all of this is quite irrelevant to the subject before us.

The alleged Thomist definition of God as synonymous with Anselm’s definition is false, as Thomists are in the Christian tradition and hence ultimately define God in terms of Scripture. This is one of the biggest problems with Thomism, the god it proves is not the God of Christian Scripture though the Thomist will try his or her hardest to have a person believe that it is. Merely labeling the supposed result of a syllogism “God” does not close the gap between what has actually been proven, if anything, and what the God of Scripture is described to be. God is already assumed in the premises of traditional arguments for the existence of God, and in actuality the whole enterprise presupposes the existence of God anyway.

A Brief Introductory Response To Mitch LeBlanc Concerning His Question

Mitch LeBlanc has written an alleged defense of his attempt to redefine God and hence defeat the presuppositionalist program. You may find his article here:
http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-response-to-chris-bolt-on-presuppositionalism-and-gods-honesty/

During a debate, Mitch asked of Razorskiss, “What if God is deceiving you?”
Several times now I have stated that this question is subject to Fallacy of Complex Question. Mitch disagrees, writing, “I did not present a false dichotomy of a yes or no, in which case I would agree that a labelling [sic] of my question as fallacy would be warranted” and “my question (2) does not force an answer in a similar manner [to illustrative question ‘1’ (“Do you know that God is deceiving you?”)]” in an attempt to justify this disagreement. My response to this is that Mitch just needs to review the fallacy in question. For the Fallacy of Complex Question to apply to a question the question does not need to require a “Yes or No” answer, therefore Mitch’s attempted justification for disagreement on whether or not the fallacy applies fails.

This aside, I have claimed that the question “What if God is deceiving you?” requires that some consequence or consequences be named if it is the case that God is deceiving the recipient of the question. I cannot think of how any such answer, if one were able to supply it (it is inconceivable to me that God should lie), would serve to further understanding for either the Objectivist or the presuppositionalist. The point of the question appears to me to be to suggest that God can lie, and nothing more. We will examine this suggestion soon, if the Lord wills.

Dawson Bethrick, The Man Who Builds His House Upon The Sand

Bethrick’s most recent response to my post here – http://choosinghats.blogspot.com/2009/09/all-bethrick-all-time.html is frankly one of the poorest responses I have ever seen him make.

Objectivists, as I understand it, have never quite been accepted in the realm of academic philosophy (if you do not believe me, try to research the topic via philosophical sources; most encyclopedias do not even mention Objectivism or Rand). Their terminology is often extremely vague, and there is reason for this. Rand was after certainty in a world which told her, and everyone else, that there is no such thing. She presented ideas to counter this, to give people a place to stand that is peppered with pragmatism. Philosophy is not a joke or a game to Objectivists, they want something they can live and die by without worrying about the skeptic.

Of course, fiction books and obfuscation are not the route to countering, for example, the rigorous skeptical epistemologies found in the non-Christian schools I grew up in nor the atheistic and liberal Philosophy and Religion departments I did my undergraduate work in. If one is to be honest with oneself, he or she cannot simply hand waive the arguments which have been offered by the skeptics since the beginning of recorded philosophical inquiry. Thankfully there is good news for gentlemen like Mr. Bethrick. Christ offers hope for those who would find none in their allegedly God-less, directionless worlds. Christ offers certainty and knowledge as a response to the foolish wisdom of the world. All of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Him.

Unfortunately Bethrick has continued his dishonest (or perhaps ignorant, though I do not know how this could be the case at this point in his “career”) denial of rather basic facts; substituting for reality his own arbitrary beliefs to try and escape from argumentation and the skepticism it leads to.

For example Bethrick writes that there is no such thing as a circular definition, which is just false. I invite the reader to study a little logic and he or she will come across discussions of circular definitions rather quickly. Even Googling “circular definitions” brings up a lengthy list. ( For example – http://www.onegoodmove.org/fallacy/circle.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_definition )

Bethrick often recommends books. I will return the favor and recommend Copi’s Introduction to Logic, which contains a useful discussion of this subject.

Upon studying the topic of definitions in the broader subject of logic, one may also discover that definitions are often provided by way of example. Bethrick claims that I have written something “patently false” when I state that he does not provide a definition for “previously validated’ by way of example. Calling something patently false with the result that it actually becomes such may be fine in Bethrick’s Peter Pan epistemology, but it does not work out so well in reality. As I explained, the illustration provided by Bethrick does not exemplify “previously validated” at all, which is what is needed if Bethrick seeks to define the term by way of example. Again, the “definition” provided is circular, it presents us with no new understanding of the term in question. Further, “the illustration only shows an alleged use of previous validation in science rather than showing what this process is or how it works.” Bethrick responds to this, “You didn’t ask me to show how it works. I was only responding to the questions which you had asked.” No, I did not ask him to show me how it works, I asked him for a definition of what it is. He may do this by way of a non-circular definition, example, obstensibly, etc. but the point is that he has done none of the above. It may help the reader to review my previous post concerning this.

I will not at this moment take the time to review what Bethrick said concerning whether or not previously validated (whatever that means, he still has not told us) facts can be unseated by newly experienced facts. It is possible I misquoted him. It is not important. If Bethrick thinks that new facts can unseat previously validated facts but do not ever actually do so then there is no pragmatic distinction being made. The argument remains the same.

The vacuousness of the next part of Bethrick’s response is equivalent to that of the part already discussed as Bethrick fails to see when the very arguments he uses apply to his own position. Recall, for example, that Bethrick submits in his illustration that the scientist, after having apparently tested or at least after having relied upon testimony of the testing of water, knows that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Now, I submitted that the scientist does not know this at all, for the scientist has only “previously validated” the elemental make-up of a particular sample of water in a specific time and place. Bethrick essentially equivocates on his use of the term “water” when he uses it in his illustration to refer to the specific sample of water and then uses it again to refer to water in a much more general, if not universal sense. The scientist does not know the elemental make-up of water as he has not tested water as such. It is, yet again, dishonest of Bethrick to act as though I have not provided a reason for the claim that I make that the scientist does not know the elemental make-up of water. Further, as mentioned, Bethrick’s questions would cut both ways anyway. We may simply turn the questions Bethrick asks around for him to answer, “How do you know that the scientist [does know this]? How do you know what someone else does or does not know?” Of course on Bethrick’s view I do not see how he can know that other people have the consciousnesses that I would presume are required for knowledge anyway, so asking questions like how one person knows what another person knows become even more interesting.

Obviously my mind is not identical to the mind which is said to know and control everything, and Bethrick is well aware that I believe this. Again with the dishonesty. This aside, a mind need not be identical to another mind in order to receive information from it.

Bethrick fails to distinguish between causation and a particular causal process in his response, something I did not do in my post, as he writes, ‘How do you know that I cannot observe causation?’ in response to ‘Bethrick does not know the causal process…” Once he does this we can move on to topics like how his worldview supposedly allows him to observe causation and how his worldview supposedly allows for causality which is knowable. Based on Bethrick’s previous rampant redefinition of terms to suit his fancy I suspect we will be receiving some completely nonsense ‘description’ of causal processes made up in order to skate around the problems raised rather than to actually deal with them.

Bethrick writes: “I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.” When I write, “Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie” the referent of “this” is the statement regarding being in the same boat together. Is Bethrick really so ignorant of Christian beliefs that he thinks I am claiming omniscience for myself? Of course not. It is just more dishonest, empty rhetoric. I ask the reader to question why someone would need to constantly resort to this type of tactic.

Bethrick asks, ‘…what does merely believing “in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie” have to do with anything?’ I trust that the reader is competent enough to understand the argument and that Bethick has no answer for it, hence the pretended ignorance. All-knowing, truthful God revealing His certain knowledge to us provides us with certain knowledge of what has been revealed. I am sorry, this is not difficult.

Once again I call upon Mr. Bethrick to repent from his sin and believe on the living Christ who will not cast him away.

All Bethrick All The Time

I asked Mr. Bethrick what “previously validated knowledge” is, since he claims one can know a great deal based upon this, to which he responded, “Previously validated knowledge is knowledge that has already been validated, specifically in the context of new discoveries.”

Of course, circular definitions are definitions which are circular. I do not see that Bethrick ever actually defines what he means by previous validation in a non-circular way nor does he offer an example. He apparently attempts to offer an example of “previous validation” but the illustration only shows an alleged use of previous validation in science rather than showing what this process is or how it works. Additionally, the so called instance of previous validation offered turns out to be an illustration of something other than what he has already presented regarding previously validated facts. Bethrick has mentioned before that previously validated facts cannot be unseated by newly experienced facts while the current illustration is of an individual being able to move from previously validated facts to new facts that are presumably based upon or at least involve previously validated facts. Bethrick has not given us a non-circular definition or example of “previously validated knowledge” and has not illustrated that newly experienced facts do not unseat previously validated knowledge.

Bethrick’s illustration of an individual being able to move from previously validated facts to new facts based upon or involving previously validated facts is as follows:

“…when a scientist studies the flow tendencies of rain water in a particular valley, he does not have to begin every day of his research by discovering the elemental make-up of water. Once this has been discovered and validated, he can move on to exploring new discoveries. That water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, is knowledge that has, in the context of the scientist’s research, been previously validated.”

My problem with this illustration is that the referent of “this” in the second sentence of the illustration is to the elemental make-up of water. Bethrick writes that the elemental make-up of water has been discovered and validated, but this is incorrect. The elemental make-up of water on a particular day in a particular valley has been discovered by a particular scientist if it was discovered by the scientist at all and if Bethrick’s validation is the kind of process which can bring one to this kind of knowledge to begin with. The scientist in the illustration does not know what the elemental make-up of all water is or what the elemental make-up of other water is or what the elemental make-up of elsewhere water is or if the elemental-makeup of water which was previously validated has not changed since yesterday.

He writes, “Perhaps Bolt thinks I need to go out and test every raindrop that has ever fallen on earth in order to be ‘certain’ that rain is composed of water droplets. With such requirements for any generalized certainty, it seems to be an unattainable commodity”.

Well yes, it is unattainable for him, and not just certainty, but for probability as well. He posits that this is the same for those receiving knowledge from a supernatural source, which of course it is not if that source knows and controls everything.

How does Bethrick try to deal with his problem here? He writes, “But if we understand the causal process which produces rain (cf. condensation of water vapor in the atmosphere), why would such tests be needed?” Of course, Mr. Bethrick does not know the causal process which produces rain, for not only can he not observe causation, he does not know that the same causal process produces all rain. He then asks if people who depend on and collect rain water for their survival need to perform such tests. The answer is contingent upon what he means by “need”.

Bethrick writes, “I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.”

Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie. Bethrick apparently thinks it would be clever and profitable to ask questions like, “What if your God could lie though? What if your God does not know everything? What if your God has fur?” but as has already been explained to him multiple times now, I believe in the Christian God who neither lies nor lacks knowledge nor has fur. It has become evident that Bethrick cannot answer the arguments presented based on this conception of God and so he must resort to setting up a straw man and attacking the presuppositional argument by substituting another god that none of us believe in to begin with. At this point it has become clear that Bethrick is just dishonest when it comes to this part of the argument.

Bethrick does not accept that newly experienced facts may unseat previously validated knowledge. I do not see that it would be difficult to illustrate that newly experienced facts may unseat previously validated knowledge however, which would of course have the interesting result that the prior fact was not knowledge after all. Let us suppose that the scientist tested and determined that the water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen then woke up to find that while he had dreamed this, the world, which included water, was really very different and water was made up of different elements, elements which were not even on the Periodic Table of the Elements in his dream world. Perhaps there is no such Table in the real world that he did not experience prior to waking up. We thought we had validated the fact that Pluto is a planet. Now if we can be wrong with respect to all sorts of similar things and indeed often are, why can we not be wrong with respect to essentially everything in similar fashion?

If the world is as Bethrick posits that it is then there is always a possibility that some hitherto unknown fact may radically change our apparent knowledge of the world as it is now. This fact may be related to something as seemingly insignificant as where the end of a sentence is in a Greek manuscript or it could be an extremely significant fact with huge consequences for what we know. How do we know that new information will fit with old rather than overturn it? The truth is that we do not know this at all if the world is as Bethick submits that it is.

Bethrick invites me to produce some fact or facts which will overturn a piece of his knowledge, however the argument does not rest upon exemplary facts, which would miss the whole point, but upon the possibility that there are such facts. We know that there are such facts with respect to some parts of knowledge, why not with respect to other parts of knowledge? The argument does not require that I produce any facts to overturn what we know about rain. If Bethrick does not know that there are no such facts, then he cannot claim to know what he does concerning rain. Bethrick does not know all facts, hence he cannot claim to know what he does concerning rain.

Bethrick makes the following amusing statement in a last ditch effort to wish away the reality of skepticism he is forced to accept for sake of consistency with his own program. He states,

“I do not ascribe [I think he meant to write “subscribe”] to the epistemological model which equates “possibility” with whatever the human mind can imagine. I can imagine breathing water, but I do not accept it as a possibility that I will ever be able to breathe water. To affirm a possibility, one needs at least some evidence to support it, and no evidence against it.”

Apparently suggesting that other peoples’ gods have fur and redefining terms at will is not enough for would-be autonomous Bethrick, as he now gets to decide what is possible! I do not find this to be very “objective” at all. Since Dawson Bethrick does not accept that it is possible to ever be able to breathe water, it is therefore impossible that he will ever be able to breathe water. Never mind that we can imagine a world in which Bethrick can breathe water, never mind that there is nothing at all logically inconsistent with Bethrick breathing water, and never mind that upon consistent Bethrick presuppositions we cannot determine that breathing water will be physically problematic at some time in the future; no, Dawson Bethrick is the sole determiner of what is possible and impossible! Bethrick said it, I believe it, and that settles it! I for one am glad that Bethrick did not live in the past and believe that Earth is flat, as it would have forever been impossible that it should be otherwise. Imagine back-in-the-day-Bethrick experiencing the flatness of Earth and never hearing of planetary motion. No evidence to support Earth being other than flat, and no evidence against earth being flat either, so forget the possibility that Earth is as we know it to be now. Forget cars and the Internet as well. I am sure if we pressed this further we could come up with all sorts of interesting results, but it suffices to say that Bethrick, in his sinful autonomy, wants to be like God, determining what is possible. He does this even at the expense of leaving every definition offered by Webster’s for “possibility” and “possible” behind, the same dictionary he uses to try and justify his calling God a magical being. Why start being consistent now though?

By the way, the Bible never uses such a term as “magic” to describe God and neither should Bethrick, first because Bethrick inconsistently appeals to Webster’s on the definition of this term but not “possibility”, second because he apparently misunderstands the definition he cites anyway, as said definition mentions extraordinary power or influence which is “seemingly” from a supernatural source, (What supernatural *source* is God *seemingly* from according to the Bible?) third because “magic” is a noun, not an adjective, fourth because the adjective related to the noun is so closely related to the noun that it falls prey to the same problems of labeling the God of the Bible as “magic”, and fifth because the term is clearly intended to conjure(since we are talking about magic) up in the mind of the reader a picture of evidentiary status like unto fantasy creatures which is to beg the question. God does not cast magical spells, but he does command men everywhere to repent.

I asked Mr. Bethrick how he knows that water might not turn into merlot the next time he drinks it.

He states that his answer is simple. His answer is that he knows this by a means of knowledge. This is almost as enlightening as “previously validated” meaning “validated previously”. He goes on to specify that he knows this through his reason. Okay, so far so good, but how does Bethrick know through the use of reason? He goes on to say that he uses a method called logic. I would ask Mr. Bethrick which law of logic he utilizes to know that water might not turn into merlot the next time he drinks it, but it appears that he has once again redefined a term. Bethrick describes logic as “an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge”. How do you know your water won’t turn into merlot? “Well the answer is simple, I know through an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge.” Most of us have encountered something like this answer in a field at least once. It really is a simple question. Where is the simple answer promised? I do not see how drinking a glass of water has a great deal to do with new knowledge as far as what we are concerned with here, and in any event Bethrick has not explained how he integrates his knowledge with what he has already validated, whatever “validated” means. It is not that Bethrick cannot be certain about the water remaining water, it is that he cannot know at all that it will. He moves on to attempting to set up another straw man concept of a god that Christians do not believe in only this time he wants us to believe in a god who is malevolent and has a tattoo of Silent Bob on its stomach.